The Modularity of Mind

Knowledge Graph: The Modularity of Mind (Jerry Fodor, 1983)

Editorial spotlight: ↑ the great divide: input systems vs. central cognition

Concepts

• Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide (importance 5): The core architectural claim: perceptual/linguistic input analyzers are modular; higher cognition (belief fixation, problem solving) is not. This asymmetry defines the book's argument.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's informational encapsulation (importance 5): Modules cannot access all the information the organism knows; they run on proprietary databases. This is the signature property distinguishing modules from central processes.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's domain specificity (importance 4): Each module processes only a restricted class of inputs (visual, auditory linguistic, etc.). Not a general-purpose processor.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's mandatory operation (importance 4): You cannot choose not to parse speech you understand, or not to see depth in a stereo image. Modules fire automatically when triggered.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's shallow outputs (importance 4): Modules deliver representations at a fixed level of abstraction (e.g., phonetic transcription, 3D surface layout), not full interpretations. Depth happens centrally.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's isotropy of central cognition (importance 4): Potentially any fact can be relevant to any inference. No principled boundaries on what information belief fixation might draw upon.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's Quinean property of belief (importance 4): Beliefs confront evidence holistically (Quine); no single proposition is immune to revision. Central cognition is globally sensitive.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's frame problem for central systems (importance 4): How does a non-encapsulated system decide which facts are relevant without searching infinitely? No known computational solution. This is why central cognition remains mysterious.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's vertical faculties (modules) (importance 4): Input systems are 'vertical' — each handles one content domain (vision, hearing, language) with proprietary algorithms.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's cognitive impenetrability of modules (importance 4): Beliefs cannot alter modular processing. You can't will yourself to see the Müller-Lyer lines as equal. Encapsulation entails impenetrability.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's computational tractability via encapsulation (importance 4): Modules solve the search problem by limiting their databases. Central systems face combinatorial explosion because they're unencapsulated.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• belief fixation as central process (importance 4): How perception + memory → new beliefs. The paradigm central operation. Isotropic, slow, unencapsulated.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's fast processing constraint (importance 3): Modules compute rapidly because encapsulation limits the search space. Speed is a design consequence of shallow databases.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's fixed neural architecture (importance 3): Modules are tied to dedicated, genetically specified neural circuits. Damage to the circuit causes predictable impairment.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns (importance 3): Brain damage produces specific aphasias, agnosias, etc. — not global cognitive decline. Evidence for distinct modules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's ontogenetic universality (importance 3): Modular capacities emerge on a fixed schedule across individuals (language milestones, depth perception). Not learned through general intelligence.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's horizontal faculties (classical view) (importance 3): Memory, attention, reasoning — cut across domains. Fodor argues these are central, not modular. Opposes faculty psychology's horizontal slicing.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• abductive inference (inference to best explanation) (importance 3): Central cognition's characteristic operation. Requires global evaluation of hypotheses against all background beliefs. Inherently non-modular.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's transducers (importance 3): Sensory transduction (retinal photoreceptors, cochlear hair cells) converts physical energy to neural code. Pre-modular; modules take transduced representations as input.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodorian concepts (unstructured atoms) (importance 3): Lexical concepts are atomic symbols, not decomposable. Connects to language of thought hypothesis. Relevant to why central processes resist analysis.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's nativism about modules (importance 3): Modular architecture is innate (ontogenetic universality). Learning configures parameters but doesn't create the modules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• poverty of stimulus argument for innateness (importance 3): Chomsky's argument: children acquire language despite impoverished input. Modules must be innately structured.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• attention as non-modular (importance 3): Voluntary attention is central (you decide what to attend). But modules can capture attention bottom-up (loud noise). Attention straddles the divide.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• general intelligence as central (importance 3): IQ, g-factor: domain-general problem-solving. Exactly what modularity denies for input systems. Intelligence lives in unencapsulated central processes.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• scientific reasoning as unencapsulated (importance 3): Theory choice in science draws on all background knowledge. Exemplifies central isotropy. No modular model exists.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• object recognition as post-modular (importance 3): Recognizing 'cup' vs 'vase' may require memory, context. Fodor: this is central, not part of vision module proper.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• reflex arcs as sub-modular (importance 2): Spinal reflexes are even more encapsulated than modules (no central outputs). Modules sit between reflexes and central cognition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• critical periods for module maturation (importance 2): Language, depth perception develop on timetables. Miss the window (feral children, monocular deprivation) → module doesn't mature. Evidence for fixed architecture.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• memory as horizontal (non-modular) (importance 2): Long-term memory stores all content types. Not domain-specific, not encapsulated. Classical 'faculty' but not a Fodorian module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• simulation theory of mind-reading (importance 2): One view: ToM uses domain-general simulation. Fodor doesn't commit, but later work (by others) treats ToM as a module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• theory-theory of concepts (importance 2): Concepts as mini-theories (prototype + explanation). Opposes Fodor's atomism. Central cognition might work this way; modules don't.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• perceptual learning within modules (importance 2): Wine tasters, radiologists improve perception. Fodor: learning tunes module parameters, doesn't break encapsulation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• prototype theory (Rosch) (importance 2): Concepts organized around typical exemplars. Fodor sees this as descriptive of central categorization, not modular processing.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• compositionality of thought (importance 2): Thought productivity requires combinatorial semantics. Central systems must be compositional. Modules deliver compositional outputs (parsed sentences, 3D layouts).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• analogy as central operation (importance 2): Recognizing structural similarity across domains. Requires access to arbitrary knowledge. Central, not modular.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's semantic transparency of modules (importance 2): Module outputs are semantically interpretable (phonemes, edges, surface normals). Modules don't produce raw sense data.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's automaticity ≈ mandatoriness (importance 2): Modules run without executive control. Stroop effect: you can't not read the word. Automaticity follows from encapsulation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• motor systems as modular? (importance 2): Fodor focuses on input; doesn't commit on motor. Later theorists propose output modules (e.g., speech articulation, reaching).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• vertical integration within modules (importance 2): Each module stacks layers (transduction → feature extraction → categorization). But the whole stack is encapsulated from other modules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• bootstrapping in development (importance 2): Early modular outputs scaffold later ones (phonemes → words → syntax). But bootstrapping ≠ penetration; modules mature, don't merge.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• symbol grounding via modules (importance 2): Modules convert world into symbolic representations (LOT). Solve Searle's 'Chinese room' problem by tying syntax to perceptual semantics.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• consciousness and modularity (importance 2): Fodor: modular processing is largely unconscious (you don't experience phoneme parsing). Consciousness lives at central level. But doesn't fully theorize this.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Claims

• Fodor's modularity thesis (importance 5): Input systems exhibit domain specificity, informational encapsulation, mandatory operation, fast processing, shallow outputs, fixed neural architecture, characteristic breakdown patterns, and ontogenetic universality.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated (importance 5): Belief fixation, abductive reasoning, scientific inference — these access all available information. Isotropic and Quinean: any belief can interact with any other.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes (importance 5): Because central systems are isotropic and Quinean, they resist computational modeling. Cognitive science may succeed only for modules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's modularity is input-only (importance 5): THE crucial limitation: Fodor restricts modularity to input systems. Higher cognition (thought, planning, problem-solving) is explicitly non-modular. This is what massive modularity theorists reject.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Modularity of Mind's enduring influence (importance 4): Defined terms of debate for 40 years. Input modularity widely accepted; central non-modularity remains contested. Book's pessimism about cognitive science of thought still resonates.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• New Look: perception is theory-laden (importance 3): Bruner, Hanson: what you see depends on what you believe. Fodor argues this confuses central interpretation with modular input processing.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's modularity as graded (importance 3): Systems can be more or less modular (satisfy more/fewer of the 9 properties). Not a binary. Language > vision in encapsulation; both > central systems.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's neo-Cartesian interactionism (importance 3): Modules deliver representations to a central rational processor (like Cartesian soul). Dualism of architecture, not substance.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• evolutionary argument for modularity (importance 3): Natural selection builds specialized organs. Mind likely similar: eyes for vision, language organ for grammar. Central cognition might be recent/fragile.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Empirical results

• garden-path sentences as encapsulation proof (importance 3): 'The horse raced past the barn fell' — parser commits before semantics intervenes. Demonstrates informational encapsulation of syntax module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Müller-Lyer illusion as mandatory operation proof (importance 3): You see the lines as unequal even knowing they're equal. Vision module ignores beliefs. Encapsulation + mandatoriness.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• McGurk effect as cross-module interference (importance 2): Visual lip movement alters auditory phoneme perception. Shows modules can interact at interfaces, but remain internally encapsulated.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Wernicke's aphasia as modular breakdown (importance 2): Damage to posterior language area impairs comprehension, not production. Double dissociation with Broca's aphasia shows modular specialization.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Broca's aphasia as modular breakdown (importance 2): Frontal damage impairs production, spares comprehension. Distinct module for motor planning of speech.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• prosopagnosia (face blindness) (importance 2): Focal brain lesion destroys face recognition while sparing object recognition. Evidence for a face-specific visual module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• phoneme restoration effect (importance 2): You 'hear' a phoneme replaced by cough as intact. Suggests top-down influence, but Fodor argues restoration happens post-module, at central interpretation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• color constancy as modular computation (importance 2): Perceived color depends on context (Land's Mondrian experiments). Computed within vision module; you can't override it by knowing illumination.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• savant syndrome as modular sparing (importance 2): Individuals with low general intelligence but preserved calendar calculation, music, drawing. Suggests modules can function despite central deficits.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Williams syndrome: language spared, reasoning impaired (importance 2): Genetic disorder: fluent syntax but poor spatial/logical reasoning. Double dissociation supports modularity of language.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• specific language impairment (SLI) (importance 2): Children with normal IQ but impaired syntax. Converse of Williams. More evidence for language module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• categorical perception of phonemes (importance 2): VOT continuum perceived as discrete /b/ vs /p/. Evidence for innate linguistic categories in speech module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Stroop effect as mandatory processing (importance 2): Naming ink color of 'RED' printed in blue is slow. Word-reading module fires automatically, interferes with color naming.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Entities

• Fodor's vision as paradigm input module (importance 4): Early vision (edge detection, stereo depth) is fast, encapsulated, mandatory. Marr's computational framework fits modular architecture.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's language parser as input module (importance 4): Syntactic parsing is encapsulated (garden-path sentences prove this), domain-specific, and mandatory. Chomskyan syntax fits modularity.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Marr's computational vision theory (importance 3): David Marr's tri-level analysis (primal sketch → 2.5D sketch → 3D model) exemplifies modular decomposition. Fodor cites this as the success case.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Chomsky's autonomous syntax (importance 3): Syntactic parsing proceeds independently of semantics and world knowledge. Encapsulation evidence for language module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's language of thought (LOT) (importance 3): Mental representations have combinatorial syntax. Earlier Fodor work (1975). Modularity is compatible with LOT but doesn't depend on it.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Gall's phrenology as failed modularity (importance 2): Franz Gall proposed domain-specific faculties (combativeness, veneration). Wrong partitioning — these are horizontal, not vertical.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• classical faculty psychology (importance 2): 18th-century view: mind divides into memory, will, reason, perception. Fodor rejects this horizontal slicing in favor of vertical input modules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• British associationism (importance 2): Locke, Hume, Mill: mind as general associative network. No modules. Fodor sees this as mistaking central processes for the whole mind.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• New Look psychology (Bruner) (importance 2): 1950s movement claiming perception is penetrated by expectation and belief. Fodor rebuts: only shallow outputs are theory-laden, not modular processing itself.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Turing test as central-process benchmark (importance 2): Passing Turing test requires isotropic belief fixation, not modular processing. Why it's so hard.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• AI microworlds (SHRDLU, blocks world) (importance 2): Success in toy domains where relevance is hand-coded. Fail in open domains because isotropy kicks in. Fodor sees this as central cognition's intractability.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Helmholtz's unconscious inference (importance 2): 19th-century idea: perception involves unconscious reasoning. Fodor: modules do inference, but it's encapsulated, not general.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Gestalt psychology (importance 2): Emphasized holistic perception (phi phenomenon, figure-ground). Fodor interprets: perceptual organization is modular, but Gestaltists missed encapsulation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Hubel & Wiesel on visual development (importance 2): Monocular deprivation in kittens → permanent blindness in that eye. Neural architecture for vision is activity-dependent but innately channeled.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Marr's primal sketch (importance 2): Early vision representation: edges, textures, zero-crossings. Modular output before object recognition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Marr's 2.5D sketch (importance 2): Viewer-centered surface orientation + depth map. Intermediate modular representation between edges and 3D models.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• massive modularity hypothesis (post-Fodor) (importance 2): Evolutionary psychologists (Cosmides, Tooby) extend modularity to central cognition (cheater-detection, mate-choice modules). Fodor rejects this.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• connectionist networks (PDP) (importance 2): 1980s neural network revival. Non-modular, distributed processing. Fodor sees these as models of central systems, not modules (though modules might be implemented as networks).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Baars' global workspace theory (importance 2): Consciousness as broadcast to specialized modules. Post-Fodor theory; compatible with modularity but addresses what Fodor leaves open.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's later anti-modularity turn (importance 2): In 2000s, Fodor argued against massive modularity, defended holistic central processes. Modularity of Mind planted seeds for both sides.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Pinker's language instinct (importance 2): Popular defense of language module, inspired by Fodor + Chomsky. Extends Fodorian modularity to grammar acquisition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Bayesian brain / predictive processing (importance 2): Modern framework: perception as probabilistic inference. Can be implemented modularly (encapsulated priors) or globally. Post-Fodor debate.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Winograd's SHRDLU (importance 1): 1970s natural language system for blocks world. Works because domain is tiny. Doesn't scale — frame problem bites.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Edwin Land's Mondrian demos (importance 1): Showed color perception compensates for illumination. Evidence for encapsulated visual algorithms.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Genie (feral child case) (importance 1): Child isolated until puberty never fully acquired syntax. Critical period evidence for language module.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• voice onset time (VOT) (importance 1): Acoustic cue for voicing (/b/ vs /p/). Continuous signal, categorical percept. Classic phonetics example of modular discretization.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Selfridge's Pandemonium model (importance 1): Parallel feature demons compete for recognition. Early connectionist architecture. Fodor: consistent with modular processing if demons are encapsulated.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Tooby & Cosmides (importance 1): Founders of evolutionary psychology. Argued for hundreds of domain-specific modules. Directly opposed to Fodor's central-is-unencapsulated claim.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cheater-detection module (Cosmides) (importance 1): Proposed domain-specific reasoning module. Fodor would classify this as central, not modular (it's belief fixation about social contracts).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Rumelhart & McClelland PDP (importance 1): Parallel Distributed Processing framework. Challenged symbolic AI. Fodor: OK for pattern recognition (modules), not for thought (central).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Searle's Chinese Room (importance 1): Argument that syntax doesn't suffice for semantics. Fodor: modules provide the semantic grounding; central systems manipulate grounded symbols.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Dennett's intentional stance (importance 1): Interpreting systems as rational agents. Fodor: this works for central cognition (belief-desire psychology), not for modules (which are mechanical).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• embodied cognition movement (importance 1): 1990s-2000s: cognition is sensorimotor, not symbolic. Opposes both modularity and LOT. Fodor dismisses as missing the computational level.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Relations

• Fodor's modularity thesis supports Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• Fodor's informational encapsulation supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's domain specificity supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's mandatory operation supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's fast processing constraint supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's shallow outputs supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's fixed neural architecture supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's ontogenetic universality supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's informational encapsulation contradicts Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's isotropy of central cognition supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's Quinean property of belief supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's frame problem for central systems evidences Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated supports Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes
• Fodor's isotropy of central cognition supports Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes
• Fodor's frame problem for central systems supports Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes
• Fodor's vision as paradigm input module exemplifies Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's language parser as input module exemplifies Fodor's modularity thesis
• Marr's computational vision theory supports Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• Chomsky's autonomous syntax supports Fodor's language parser as input module
• garden-path sentences as encapsulation proof evidences Fodor's informational encapsulation
• garden-path sentences as encapsulation proof evidences Fodor's language parser as input module
• Müller-Lyer illusion as mandatory operation proof evidences Fodor's mandatory operation
• Müller-Lyer illusion as mandatory operation proof evidences Fodor's informational encapsulation
• McGurk effect as cross-module interference supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's vertical faculties (modules) exemplifies Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's horizontal faculties (classical view) contradicts Fodor's modularity thesis
• Gall's phrenology as failed modularity exemplifies Fodor's horizontal faculties (classical view)
• classical faculty psychology exemplifies Fodor's horizontal faculties (classical view)
• British associationism exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• abductive inference (inference to best explanation) exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• New Look: perception is theory-laden contradicts Fodor's informational encapsulation
• New Look psychology (Bruner) supports New Look: perception is theory-laden
• Fodor's cognitive impenetrability of modules supports Fodor's informational encapsulation
• Fodor's transducers requires Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's informational encapsulation enables Fodor's computational tractability via encapsulation
• Fodor's computational tractability via encapsulation enables Fodor's fast processing constraint
• Wernicke's aphasia as modular breakdown evidences Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns
• Broca's aphasia as modular breakdown evidences Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns
• prosopagnosia (face blindness) evidences Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns
• phoneme restoration effect supports Fodor's shallow outputs
• Fodorian concepts (unstructured atoms) supports Fodor's language of thought (LOT)
• Fodor's language of thought (LOT) supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Turing test as central-process benchmark requires Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• AI microworlds (SHRDLU, blocks world) evidences Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes
• Winograd's SHRDLU exemplifies AI microworlds (SHRDLU, blocks world)
• Helmholtz's unconscious inference supports Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• reflex arcs as sub-modular supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Gestalt psychology supports Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• color constancy as modular computation evidences Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• Edwin Land's Mondrian demos evidences color constancy as modular computation
• Fodor's nativism about modules supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• poverty of stimulus argument for innateness supports Fodor's nativism about modules
• critical periods for module maturation supports Fodor's nativism about modules
• Genie (feral child case) evidences critical periods for module maturation
• Hubel & Wiesel on visual development evidences Fodor's fixed neural architecture
• attention as non-modular supports Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• memory as horizontal (non-modular) exemplifies Fodor's horizontal faculties (classical view)
• general intelligence as central exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• savant syndrome as modular sparing evidences Fodor's modularity thesis
• Williams syndrome: language spared, reasoning impaired evidences Fodor's language parser as input module
• specific language impairment (SLI) evidences Fodor's language parser as input module
• perceptual learning within modules supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• prototype theory (Rosch) supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• compositionality of thought supports Fodor's language of thought (LOT)
• belief fixation as central process exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• scientific reasoning as unencapsulated exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• analogy as central operation exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Marr's primal sketch exemplifies Marr's computational vision theory
• Marr's 2.5D sketch exemplifies Marr's computational vision theory
• object recognition as post-modular exemplifies Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's semantic transparency of modules supports Fodor's shallow outputs
• categorical perception of phonemes evidences Fodor's language parser as input module
• voice onset time (VOT) exemplifies categorical perception of phonemes
• Fodor's automaticity ≈ mandatoriness supports Fodor's mandatory operation
• Stroop effect as mandatory processing evidences Fodor's automaticity ≈ mandatoriness
• Selfridge's Pandemonium model supports Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• Fodor's modularity as graded supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's neo-Cartesian interactionism supports Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• evolutionary argument for modularity supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• massive modularity hypothesis (post-Fodor) contradicts Fodor's modularity is input-only
• Tooby & Cosmides supports massive modularity hypothesis (post-Fodor)
• cheater-detection module (Cosmides) exemplifies massive modularity hypothesis (post-Fodor)
• connectionist networks (PDP) supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Rumelhart & McClelland PDP exemplifies connectionist networks (PDP)
• symbol grounding via modules supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• Baars' global workspace theory builds-on Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• consciousness and modularity supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• Fodor's modularity is input-only supports Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• Fodor's later anti-modularity turn supports Modularity of Mind's enduring influence
• Pinker's language instinct builds-on Fodor's language parser as input module
• Fodor's modularity thesis supports Modularity of Mind's enduring influence
• Fodor's pessimism about cognitive science of central processes supports Modularity of Mind's enduring influence
• Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide supports Modularity of Mind's enduring influence
• Chomsky's autonomous syntax supports poverty of stimulus argument for innateness
• Fodor's shallow outputs supports Fodor's input systems vs. central systems divide
• Marr's primal sketch exemplifies Fodor's shallow outputs
• Marr's 2.5D sketch exemplifies Fodor's shallow outputs
• Fodor's fast processing constraint evidences Fodor's computational tractability via encapsulation
• Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated enables Fodor's frame problem for central systems
• Müller-Lyer illusion as mandatory operation proof evidences Fodor's cognitive impenetrability of modules
• Bayesian brain / predictive processing builds-on Fodor's modularity thesis
• Fodor's vision as paradigm input module exemplifies Fodor's vertical faculties (modules)
• Fodor's language parser as input module exemplifies Fodor's vertical faculties (modules)
• Fodor's nativism about modules supports Fodor's ontogenetic universality
• Fodor's fixed neural architecture enables Fodor's characteristic breakdown patterns
• Fodor's transducers requires Fodor's vision as paradigm input module
• Fodor's transducers requires Fodor's language parser as input module
• symbol grounding via modules supports Fodor's language of thought (LOT)
• Searle's Chinese Room motivates symbol grounding via modules
• Dennett's intentional stance supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• vertical integration within modules supports Fodor's modularity thesis
• bootstrapping in development supports Fodor's modularity as graded
• motor systems as modular? builds-on Fodor's modularity thesis
• simulation theory of mind-reading supports Fodor's central systems are unencapsulated
• theory-theory of concepts contradicts Fodorian concepts (unstructured atoms)
• embodied cognition movement contradicts Fodor's modularity thesis
• embodied cognition movement contradicts Fodor's language of thought (LOT)

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