The Scientist in the Crib: What Early Learning Tells Us About the Mind

Knowledge Graph: The Scientist in the Crib: What Early Learning Tells Us About the Mind (Alison Gopnik, Andrew Meltzoff, Patricia Kuhl, 1999)

Editorial spotlight: ↑ babies as scientists: the theory-experiment-revision loop

Concepts

• Gopnik's theory theory (importance 5): Children's learning operates like scientific theory formation: they build abstract causal theories, test predictions, revise when evidence contradicts. Not association or conditioning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge) (importance 5): Babies are born not with built-in knowledge but with powerful built-in learning mechanisms that rapidly construct knowledge from experience.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Kuhl's statistical learning in phonetics (importance 5): Infants track statistical regularities in speech streams to segment words and learn phonetic categories specific to their language. Probabilistic learning, not rule learning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• social gating of phonetic learning (importance 4): Infants only learn phonetic categories from live human interaction, not from TV or audio alone. Social context gates statistical learning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• joint attention (importance 4): By 9-12 months, infants follow adults' gaze and pointing to establish shared focus on objects. Foundation for word learning and cultural transmission.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• intention reading (importance 4): Infants attribute goals and intentions to others. They understand that actions are caused by mental states (desires, beliefs) not just mechanical forces.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• theory of mind (importance 4): The ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) to self and others, and understand that others' mental states differ from one's own.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• pretend play as theory testing (importance 4): Children's pretend play functions like thought experiments: they create alternative worlds to test theories about how the real world works.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• overhypotheses (abstract generalizations) (importance 4): Children form abstract generalizations (overhypotheses) that constrain future learning. E.g. 'objects have single consistent labels', 'causes precede effects'.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• causal maps (importance 4): Children build structured representations of cause-effect relationships (causal maps) that support prediction, explanation, and intervention.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• lantern consciousness vs spotlight attention (importance 4): Babies have 'lantern' consciousness: diffuse, broad, all possibilities illuminated. Adults have 'spotlight': focused, selective, goal-driven.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• extended childhood as learning adaptation (importance 4): Humans have longest childhood of any species. This protected period enables massive learning and cultural transmission. Evolution traded maturity for flexibility.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• conceptual change (importance 4): Fundamental reorganization of knowledge, not just accretion. Children's theories undergo revolutions like scientific theories. Central to Gopnik's thesis.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• motherese (infant-directed speech) (importance 3): Exaggerated pitch contours, slower tempo, clearer phonetic boundaries. Universal across cultures. Helps infants segment and learn language.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• perceptual narrowing (importance 3): Learning causes perception to become more specialized and less flexible. Expertise in one domain (e.g. native language) reduces sensitivity to others.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• categorical perception in speech (importance 3): Infants (and adults) hear phonemes categorically rather than continuously. A VOT of 20ms vs 40ms sounds like different phonemes, not a gradient.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• counterfactual reasoning in preschoolers (importance 3): Preschoolers can reason about what would have happened if conditions were different. Essential for causal understanding and theory revision.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Bayesian hypothesis revision (importance 3): Children's theory revision follows Bayesian principles: they weight evidence by likelihood and update beliefs proportionally. Implicit probabilistic reasoning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• mutual exclusivity bias (importance 3): Children assume each object has exactly one label. When they hear a new word, they map it to an unlabeled object, not an already-named one.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• fast mapping (importance 3): Children learn new words after a single exposure. They make rapid initial hypotheses about word meaning and refine them over time.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• taxonomic assumption (importance 3): Children assume new words label categories (e.g. 'dog' = all dogs) not individual objects. Drives rapid vocabulary growth.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• intervention distinguishes causation from correlation (importance 3): Children use active intervention (not just passive observation) to disambiguate causal structure. Doing reveals causation; watching reveals correlation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• explanatory drive (importance 3): Children are intrinsically motivated to find explanations for phenomena. The 'why' question cascade reflects this drive to build causal theories.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• core knowledge systems (Spelke) (importance 3): Infants possess early-developing domain-specific systems for objects, number, space, and social agents. These provide initial constraints for learning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• object permanence (importance 3): Infants understand that objects continue to exist when occluded. Evident by 3-4 months in looking-time studies, earlier than Piaget claimed.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• semantic bootstrapping (importance 3): Children use word meanings to infer grammatical categories. E.g. object words tend to be nouns. Meaning provides entry point into syntax.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• syntactic bootstrapping (importance 3): Children use syntactic frames to infer word meanings. E.g. 'gorping the rabbit' vs 'gorping with the rabbit' implies different meanings for 'gorp'.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• poverty of stimulus argument (importance 3): Chomsky's claim: children's linguistic input underdetermines grammar they acquire. Therefore universal grammar must be innate. Gopnik disputes this.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• connectionist networks (importance 3): Neural network models that learn via statistical weight adjustment. Gopnik et al. cite these as evidence that rich behavior emerges from simple learning rules.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• sensitive periods (not critical periods) (importance 3): Time windows when learning is easiest, not impossible outside the window. Language, vision, attachment all show sensitive periods.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• attachment theory (Bowlby/Ainsworth) (importance 3): Infants form emotional bonds with caregivers. Secure attachment predicts better social and cognitive outcomes. Affects later relationships.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• social referencing (importance 3): Infants look to caregivers' emotional expressions to interpret ambiguous situations. E.g. visual cliff: cross if caregiver smiles, avoid if fearful.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cultural apprenticeship (importance 3): Children learn skills and knowledge through participation in cultural practices with more expert partners. Learning is embedded in social context.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• natural pedagogy (importance 3): Humans evolved specialized teaching behaviors and learning biases. Teaching and learning are complementary adaptations for cultural transmission.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• ostensive cues (eye contact, motherese) (importance 3): Cues that signal 'this information is for you': eye contact, infant-directed speech, calling name. Trigger pedagogical learning mode.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• inhibitory control develops gradually (importance 3): Prefrontal cortex matures slowly. Young children can't inhibit prepotent responses. This enables exploration but reduces focused attention.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• exploration-exploitation tradeoff (importance 3): Learning requires balancing exploration (trying new things) and exploitation (using known strategies). Children are biased toward exploration.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• intrinsic motivation for learning (importance 3): Children learn for its own sake, not for external rewards. Curiosity, mastery motivation, and play are intrinsically rewarding.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Piagetian constructivism (importance 3): Children actively construct knowledge through interaction with world. Not passive receptacles. Gopnik builds on and revises Piaget's framework.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• continuous learning vs discrete stages (importance 3): Gopnik et al. favor continuous theory revision over Piaget's discrete stages. Development is gradual accumulation and reorganization of knowledge.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Vygotsky's zone of proximal development (importance 3): Gap between what child can do alone vs with guidance. Learning happens in this zone through scaffolded interaction with more competent partners.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• scaffolding (importance 3): Adults provide temporary support that enables children to perform beyond current level. As child gains competence, adult withdraws support.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• embodied cognition in infancy (importance 3): Thought is grounded in sensorimotor experience. Infants learn through action: reaching, mouthing, locomotion. Abstract concepts built on bodily experience.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• neural plasticity in early development (importance 3): Brain is most plastic in infancy and early childhood. Experience shapes neural connections. Window for some learning (e.g. phonetics) closes early.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cultural variation in learning content (importance 3): While learning mechanisms are universal, content varies by culture. What children learn depends on cultural practices and values.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• evolutionary developmental psychology (importance 3): Human cognitive development reflects evolutionary adaptations. Extended childhood, social learning, theory of mind evolved for cultural transmission.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cultural evolution (ratchet effect) (importance 3): Humans uniquely accumulate cultural knowledge across generations. Each generation builds on previous. Requires high-fidelity learning (imitation, teaching).. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cumulative culture (importance 3): Knowledge and technology accumulate over generations. No individual reinvents everything. Depends on faithful social learning mechanisms.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• naïve theories (importance 3): Informal, intuitive theories children construct about domains (physics, psychology, biology). Often contain misconceptions but support learning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Fodor's modularity (importance 2): Claim that mind contains encapsulated, domain-specific modules (language, vision, etc.). Gopnik argues against strong modularity.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• neoteny (retention of juvenile traits) (importance 2): Humans retain juvenile features (large brain-to-body ratio, curiosity, playfulness) into adulthood. Correlates with learning ability.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• synaptic pruning (importance 2): Unused neural connections are eliminated. Brain overproduces synapses in infancy, then prunes based on experience. Use it or lose it.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• teleological reasoning (design stance) (importance 2): Children assume objects exist for purposes. They ask 'what is X for?' This helps learn artifact functions but can mislead in biology.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• psychological essentialism (importance 2): Children believe categories have hidden essences that cause observable properties. E.g. being a dog is an internal property, not just appearance.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• inductive projection (importance 2): Generalizing from examples to category. Children more readily project properties within a kind (all dogs have X) than across kinds.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• animacy detection (importance 2): Infants distinguish animate from inanimate objects. Animate things move on their own, respond to goals. Foundation for social cognition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• mindblindness (Baron-Cohen) (importance 2): Inability to attribute mental states to others. Baron-Cohen proposes this explains autism. Gopnik discusses but doesn't fully endorse.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• simulation theory of mind-reading (importance 2): We understand others by simulating their mental states using our own mind as model. Alternative to theory-theory for social cognition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• folk psychology (importance 2): Intuitive theory of mind that explains behavior via beliefs, desires, intentions. Children develop this by age 4-5.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• folk physics (importance 2): Intuitive theory about how physical objects behave: solidity, gravity, inertia. Present in infancy, elaborated through childhood.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• folk biology (importance 2): Intuitive theory of living things: growth, inheritance, internal organs. Develops later than folk physics and folk psychology.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• incommensurability (importance 2): Successive theories may be incommensurable (not directly comparable). E.g. Newtonian vs relativistic mass. Applies to child development.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Claims

• babies are scientists metaphor (importance 5): The central claim: infants and young children learn through the same cognitive processes as scientists — observation, hypothesis, experiment, revision.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory (importance 5): Infants imitate not through motor mimicry but by inferring the goal/intention behind actions and reproducing that goal. This reveals theory of mind precursors.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• learning involves radical restructuring (importance 5): Children don't just add facts; they reorganize conceptual frameworks. Like scientific revolutions: old theory replaced by incommensurable new theory.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• input is richer than Chomsky claimed (importance 4): Children receive far more structured input than poverty-of-stimulus assumes: motherese, joint attention, statistical regularities, social scaffolding.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• language learning is domain-general (importance 4): Gopnik et al. argue language is learned via same mechanisms (statistical learning, theory formation) used in other cognitive domains. Not a special faculty.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• babies have richer consciousness than adults (importance 4): Gopnik argues infants experience broader, less filtered consciousness. Adults' focused attention filters out possibilities; babies hold more options open.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• play is the work of childhood (importance 4): Play (pretend play, object exploration, social play) is how children test theories, practice skills, and learn about the world. Not frivolous but essential.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Piaget underestimated infant competence (importance 4): New methods reveal infants know more earlier than Piaget thought. But his emphasis on active construction and theory change remains valid.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• developmental sequence is universal (importance 3): Core developmental milestones (object permanence, joint attention, theory of mind) emerge in same order across cultures. Suggests biological foundation.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Empirical results

• native language magnet effect (importance 4): By 6 months, infants' phonetic perception warps toward native language categories. They lose ability to discriminate non-native contrasts. Learning creates perceptual constraints.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Meltzoff's neonatal imitation (1977) (importance 4): Newborns (as young as 42 minutes old) can imitate facial gestures like tongue protrusion. Demonstrates innate ability to map others' actions to own body.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Meltzoff's deferred imitation at 9 months (importance 4): 9-month-olds imitate actions they saw 24 hours earlier, demonstrating long-term memory and internal representation before language.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• 18-month-olds imitate intended actions (importance 4): When adults 'accidentally' fail at a task, 18-month-olds imitate the intended goal, not the failed motion. They infer intention.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• phonetic learning window closes by 12 months (importance 4): Infants can discriminate all phonetic contrasts at birth. By 12 months, they've specialized to native language and lost non-native discriminations.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• shape bias in word learning (importance 3): Children generalize new object labels by shape more than by color or texture. Shape is a more reliable category cue for solid objects.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• cross-modal transfer in neonates (importance 3): Newborns who mouth a pacifier (without seeing it) later recognize its shape visually. Touch-to-vision transfer shows integrated sensory representations.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• A-not-B error (importance 3): 8-12 month olds search for hidden object at location A even after seeing it hidden at B. Reflects immature executive function, not lack of object knowledge.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• past-tense overregularization (importance 3): Children say 'goed' instead of 'went'. Shows they've learned the -ed rule and overapply it. Evidence for rule learning, not rote memorization.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• U-shaped learning curves (importance 3): Performance gets worse before improving (e.g. irregular verbs). Reflects transition from memorization to rule application to rule+exception.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• second language learning declines with age (importance 3): Earlier exposure to second language predicts better ultimate attainment, especially for phonology and grammar. But learning possible at any age.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• deaf children invent sign language (importance 3): Deaf children with no sign input spontaneously create gestural systems with grammatical structure. Shows drive to create language is innate.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• creolization: children grammaticalize pidgins (importance 3): When children learn pidgin (grammatically impoverished), they add consistent grammar in one generation (creole). Shows children impose structure.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• face recognition narrowing (importance 3): Infants can discriminate human and monkey faces at 6 months. By 9 months, they've specialized to human faces and lost monkey face discrimination.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• means-end behavior emerges 8-12 months (importance 2): Infants use one action (pulling blanket) to achieve another goal (retrieving toy). Shows intentionality and planning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• autism and theory of mind deficits (importance 2): Children with autism often fail false belief tasks even when developmentally matched peers pass. Suggests theory of mind impairment in autism.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• self-propelled motion as animacy cue (importance 2): Infants attribute goals to objects that start moving without external cause. Self-propulsion signals agency.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Methods

• false belief task (importance 3): Tests whether children understand that others can hold beliefs that differ from reality. Classic test of theory of mind. Passed around age 4.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• blicket detector paradigm (importance 3): Experimental setup where children infer which objects ('blickets') have causal power to activate a machine. Tests causal reasoning and theory formation.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• violation-of-expectation paradigm (importance 3): Measure infant looking time to possible vs impossible events. Longer looking at impossible = expectation violated = knowledge present.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• habituation-dishabituation method (importance 2): Present stimulus repeatedly until infant habituates (stops looking). Then test with novel stimulus. Dishabituation indicates discrimination.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• preferential looking paradigm (importance 2): Present two stimuli side-by-side. Measure which infants look at longer. Reveals discrimination and preference without verbal response.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• high-amplitude sucking technique (importance 2): Reinforces vigorous sucking with stimulus presentation. Change in sucking rate when stimulus changes indicates discrimination.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• conjugate reinforcement (mobile kicking) (importance 2): Tie mobile to infant's foot. Kicking makes mobile move. Tests memory and learning by varying delay between training and test.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Strange Situation procedure (importance 2): Assess infant attachment by observing reunions with caregiver after brief separations. Classifies secure, avoidant, resistant, disorganized attachment.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• visual cliff apparatus (importance 2): Glass-covered platform with apparent drop-off. Tests depth perception and social referencing. Infants check caregiver's face before crossing.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Entities

• Chomsky's Universal Grammar (importance 2): Innate language faculty containing grammatical principles common to all languages. Gopnik argues against this; favors domain-general learning.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Genie (feral child case) (importance 2): Child deprived of language input until age 13. Learned vocabulary but never acquired full grammar. Evidence for sensitive period in syntax.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• prefrontal cortex maturation (importance 2): Brain region for executive function, planning, inhibitory control. Develops slowly throughout childhood. Late maturation enables extended learning period.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Williams syndrome (spared language) (importance 2): Genetic disorder with intellectual disability but relatively preserved language. Evidence that language can develop semi-independently of general cognition.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• specific language impairment (SLI) (importance 2): Language difficulties despite normal intelligence and opportunity. Shows language learning can be selectively impaired. Possible genetic component.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• Heider & Simmel animation study (importance 1): Geometric shapes moving appear to have intentions and emotions. Shows humans readily attribute mental states to minimal stimuli.. Source: (from training memory of book).
• mirror neurons (importance 1): Neurons that fire both when acting and observing same action. Potential mechanism for imitation and understanding others' actions.. Source: (from training memory of book).

Relations

• babies are scientists metaphor exemplifies Gopnik's theory theory
• Gopnik's theory theory enables conceptual change
• conceptual change exemplifies learning involves radical restructuring
• babies are scientists metaphor requires innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge)
• innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge) supports core knowledge systems (Spelke)
• Meltzoff's neonatal imitation (1977) evidences Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory
• Meltzoff's deferred imitation at 9 months evidences Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory
• 18-month-olds imitate intended actions evidences Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory
• Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory requires intention reading
• intention reading enables theory of mind
• false belief task evidences theory of mind
• Kuhl's statistical learning in phonetics enables phonetic learning window closes by 12 months
• phonetic learning window closes by 12 months evidences native language magnet effect
• native language magnet effect exemplifies perceptual narrowing
• face recognition narrowing exemplifies perceptual narrowing
• perceptual narrowing requires neural plasticity in early development
• neural plasticity in early development enables sensitive periods (not critical periods)
• sensitive periods (not critical periods) supports second language learning declines with age
• motherese (infant-directed speech) enables Kuhl's statistical learning in phonetics
• social gating of phonetic learning requires Kuhl's statistical learning in phonetics
• categorical perception in speech supports Kuhl's statistical learning in phonetics
• joint attention enables social gating of phonetic learning
• joint attention enables fast mapping
• mutual exclusivity bias enables fast mapping
• taxonomic assumption enables fast mapping
• shape bias in word learning supports fast mapping
• semantic bootstrapping enables syntactic bootstrapping
• syntactic bootstrapping enables semantic bootstrapping
• input is richer than Chomsky claimed contradicts poverty of stimulus argument
• language learning is domain-general contradicts Chomsky's Universal Grammar
• language learning is domain-general contradicts Fodor's modularity
• connectionist networks supports language learning is domain-general
• past-tense overregularization evidences language learning is domain-general
• U-shaped learning curves exemplifies past-tense overregularization
• deaf children invent sign language evidences innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge)
• creolization: children grammaticalize pidgins evidences innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge)
• Genie (feral child case) evidences sensitive periods (not critical periods)
• pretend play as theory testing exemplifies Gopnik's theory theory
• pretend play as theory testing enables counterfactual reasoning in preschoolers
• counterfactual reasoning in preschoolers enables causal maps
• blicket detector paradigm evidences causal maps
• intervention distinguishes causation from correlation enables causal maps
• overhypotheses (abstract generalizations) exemplifies Bayesian hypothesis revision
• Bayesian hypothesis revision supports Gopnik's theory theory
• explanatory drive motivates Gopnik's theory theory
• violation-of-expectation paradigm evidences object permanence
• object permanence exemplifies core knowledge systems (Spelke)
• A-not-B error evidences inhibitory control develops gradually
• inhibitory control develops gradually requires prefrontal cortex maturation
• prefrontal cortex maturation enables extended childhood as learning adaptation
• lantern consciousness vs spotlight attention exemplifies babies have richer consciousness than adults
• inhibitory control develops gradually supports lantern consciousness vs spotlight attention
• extended childhood as learning adaptation enables play is the work of childhood
• play is the work of childhood exemplifies exploration-exploitation tradeoff
• intrinsic motivation for learning motivates exploration-exploitation tradeoff
• Piagetian constructivism builds-on Gopnik's theory theory
• Piaget underestimated infant competence supports Piagetian constructivism
• continuous learning vs discrete stages supports Piagetian constructivism
• Vygotsky's zone of proximal development enables scaffolding
• scaffolding exemplifies cultural apprenticeship
• cultural apprenticeship requires natural pedagogy
• natural pedagogy requires ostensive cues (eye contact, motherese)
• ostensive cues (eye contact, motherese) enables social gating of phonetic learning
• attachment theory (Bowlby/Ainsworth) enables social referencing
• social referencing evidences visual cliff apparatus
• Strange Situation procedure evidences attachment theory (Bowlby/Ainsworth)
• embodied cognition in infancy supports means-end behavior emerges 8-12 months
• cross-modal transfer in neonates evidences embodied cognition in infancy
• habituation-dishabituation method enables preferential looking paradigm
• preferential looking paradigm evidences phonetic learning window closes by 12 months
• high-amplitude sucking technique evidences categorical perception in speech
• conjugate reinforcement (mobile kicking) evidences Meltzoff's deferred imitation at 9 months
• neural plasticity in early development enables synaptic pruning
• synaptic pruning supports sensitive periods (not critical periods)
• developmental sequence is universal evidences innate learning mechanisms (not innate knowledge)
• cultural variation in learning content supports developmental sequence is universal
• autism and theory of mind deficits evidences theory of mind
• mindblindness (Baron-Cohen) supports autism and theory of mind deficits
• Williams syndrome (spared language) refutes language learning is domain-general
• specific language impairment (SLI) refutes language learning is domain-general
• evolutionary developmental psychology supports extended childhood as learning adaptation
• evolutionary developmental psychology supports neoteny (retention of juvenile traits)
• cultural evolution (ratchet effect) enables cumulative culture
• cumulative culture requires natural pedagogy
• cumulative culture requires Meltzoff's imitation-as-theory
• teleological reasoning (design stance) supports folk psychology
• psychological essentialism enables inductive projection
• animacy detection requires self-propelled motion as animacy cue
• self-propelled motion as animacy cue enables intention reading
• Heider & Simmel animation study evidences animacy detection
• simulation theory of mind-reading contradicts Gopnik's theory theory
• mirror neurons supports simulation theory of mind-reading
• folk psychology exemplifies theory of mind
• folk physics exemplifies core knowledge systems (Spelke)
• folk biology exemplifies naïve theories
• naïve theories enables conceptual change
• learning involves radical restructuring exemplifies incommensurability
• babies are scientists metaphor supports babies have richer consciousness than adults
• lantern consciousness vs spotlight attention supports exploration-exploitation tradeoff
• Gopnik's theory theory enables overhypotheses (abstract generalizations)

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