Thinking, Fast and Slow

Knowledge Graph: Thinking, Fast and Slow (Daniel Kahneman, 2011)

Editorial spotlight: ↓ the substitution heuristic — where System 1 answers an easier question

Concepts

• Kahneman's System 1 (importance 5): Fast, automatic, intuitive thinking. Operates effortlessly and cannot be turned off. Generates impressions, feelings, and inclinations.. Source: (from training memory of book — introduced Part I).
• Kahneman's System 2 (importance 5): Slow, effortful, deliberate thinking. Requires attention and is often lazy. Monitors and controls System 1, but usually endorses its suggestions.. Source: (from training memory of book — introduced Part I).
• substitution heuristic (the core move) (importance 5): When faced with a difficult question, System 1 answers an easier related question instead—without noticing the substitution.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 9).
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory (importance 5): Alternative to expected utility theory. Decisions are made based on gains/losses relative to a reference point, not absolute wealth.. Source: (from training memory of book — Part IV, Chapter 25-26).
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) (importance 5): Losses loom larger than corresponding gains. The pain of losing $100 is about twice the pleasure of gaining $100.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• associative machine (System 1) (importance 4): System 1 continuously constructs a coherent interpretation of what is happening by linking associated ideas. Operates by spreading activation through memory.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 4).
• cognitive ease (importance 4): The subjective experience of how easy or hard mental work feels. High ease signals safety and familiarity; low ease (strain) triggers System 2.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 5).
• anchoring effect (importance 4): People's estimates are biased toward an initial value (anchor), even when that anchor is obviously random or irrelevant.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 11-12).
• availability heuristic (importance 4): Judging frequency or probability by how easily examples come to mind. Leads to systematic biases when ease of recall doesn't match actual frequency.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 12).
• representativeness heuristic (importance 4): Judging probability by how much A resembles B. Leads to neglect of base rates and sample size.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 14-15).
• WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) (importance 4): System 1 constructs the best possible story from available information, ignoring absent evidence and ambiguity.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 7).
• regression to the mean (importance 4): Extreme outcomes tend to be followed by more moderate ones. Widely misunderstood as causal rather than statistical.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 17).
• planning fallacy (importance 4): Plans and forecasts are unrealistically optimistic because planners focus on the case at hand and ignore distributional information.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 23).
• reference point (Prospect Theory) (importance 4): The psychological neutral point from which gains and losses are evaluated. Context-dependent and manipulable.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• framing effect (importance 4): Logically equivalent descriptions yield systematically different choices. '90% survival' vs '10% mortality' shifts preferences.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 28).
• Thaler mental accounting (importance 4): People organize financial decisions into separate mental accounts, violating fungibility. Explains narrow framing and sunk costs.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 30).
• experienced utility (Bentham) (importance 4): Moment-to-moment quality of experience. What people actually feel while living their lives.. Source: (from training memory of book — Part V, Chapter 35).
• remembered utility (retrospective) (importance 4): Retrospective evaluation of past experiences. Constructed by memory, not a sum of moments lived.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• experiencing self (importance 4): The self that lives in the present and knows pleasure and pain. Has no voice in decision-making.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• remembering self (importance 4): The self that keeps score and makes choices. Uses memories to evaluate the past and plan the future. Dominates decisions.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• peak-end rule (importance 4): Memory of an experience is determined by the peak (most intense moment) and the end. Duration largely neglected.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• duration neglect (importance 4): The length of an experience has little impact on remembered utility. 30 minutes of pain ≈ 60 minutes if peak and end are the same.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• focusing illusion (importance 4): Nothing in life is as important as you think it is while you are thinking about it. Attention exaggerates the importance of any factor.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• cognitive illusions (systematic) (importance 4): Errors of intuitive judgment that are predictable, universal, and difficult to avoid—even when people know about them.. Source: (from training memory of book — throughout).
• halo effect (importance 3): Tendency to like or dislike everything about a person based on one trait. First impressions exert disproportionate influence.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 7).
• affect heuristic (importance 3): Letting likes and dislikes determine beliefs about the world. Emotional evaluations guide judgments of benefit and risk.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 12).
• narrative fallacy (importance 3): Constructing coherent stories to explain the past creates an illusion of understanding and predictability.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 19).
• hindsight bias (knew-it-all-along) (importance 3): After learning an outcome, people immediately make it seem inevitable. Cannot reconstruct their prior state of uncertainty.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 19).
• outcome bias (importance 3): Judging the quality of a decision by its outcome rather than by the quality of the decision process at the time.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 19).
• inside view (singular focus) (importance 3): Forecasting by focusing on the specifics of the case, constructing scenarios. Typically overconfident.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 23).
• outside view (reference class) (importance 3): Forecasting by placing the case in a reference class and using distributional statistics. More accurate but feels impersonal.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 23).
• illusion of control (importance 3): People act as if they have more control over outcomes than they actually do. Drives overconfidence in predictions.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 24).
• diminishing sensitivity (value function) (importance 3): The marginal value of gains and losses decreases with distance from reference point. $100→$200 feels bigger than $1100→$1200.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• endowment effect (importance 3): People demand more to give up something they own than they would pay to acquire it. Ownership creates attachment.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 27).
• status quo bias (importance 3): Strong preference for the current state of affairs. Change is perceived as a loss. Default options have disproportionate power.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 27).
• sunk-cost fallacy (importance 3): Continuing a project because of past investments, even when continuing is irrational. Driven by loss aversion + mental accounting.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 27).
• fourfold pattern (Prospect Theory) (importance 3): Risk attitudes vary by probability and outcome type: risk-averse for high-prob gains, risk-seeking for high-prob losses, etc.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 29).
• possibility effect (importance 3): Extremely unlikely outcomes are overweighted. Explains lottery purchases and excessive fear of terrorism.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 29).
• certainty effect (importance 3): Outcomes that are certain are overweighted relative to merely probable outcomes. Drives preference reversals.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 29).
• narrow framing (importance 3): Evaluating decisions in isolation rather than as part of a broader portfolio. Leads to risk-averse choices that aggregate poorly.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 30).
• broad framing (rational ideal) (importance 3): Evaluating decisions by their impact on total wealth. Normatively correct but psychologically difficult.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 30).
• affective forecasting (Gilbert) (importance 3): Predicting future feelings. Systematically inaccurate due to focusing illusion and failure to account for adaptation.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• life satisfaction (global judgment) (importance 3): Answer to 'How satisfied are you with your life?' Dominated by remembering self, mood, and recent events. Weakly tied to time use.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• Econs vs Humans (Thaler) (importance 3): Econs are rational agents of economic theory. Humans are actual people with predictable biases. Economics assumes the former.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• decision weights (Prospect Theory) (importance 3): Psychological weights assigned to probabilities. Not equal to probabilities—overweight small probs, underweight moderate/high.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• theory-induced blindness (importance 3): Once you accept a theory, anomalies become invisible. Economists couldn't see violations of Expected Utility Theory.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 25).
• ego depletion (System 2 fatigue) (importance 3): Effortful mental activity depletes a limited resource. System 2 becomes less vigilant when tired or depleted.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 2).
• subjective well-being (two measures) (importance 3): Can be measured as life satisfaction (global evaluation) or experienced utility (moment-to-moment). Different correlates.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• disposition effect (stocks) (importance 2): Investors sell winners too early and hold losers too long. Mental accounting creates separate accounts per stock.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 30).
• certainty equivalent (importance 2): The sure amount that someone values equally to a gamble. Reveals loss aversion when asymmetric around zero.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• decision hygiene (importance 2): Procedures to reduce noise and bias in judgments. Includes independent assessments, checklists, and decorrelating information.. Source: (from training memory of book — conclusion).

Claims

• System 2 as lazy controller (importance 4): System 2 is reluctant to invest effort beyond the minimum. It often accepts System 1's suggestions with minimal checking.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 2).
• illusion of validity (importance 4): Confidence in judgments reflects coherence of the story one has constructed, not the quality of evidence. Narrative fit ≠ predictive accuracy.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 20).
• expert intuition validity conditions (importance 4): Intuitive expertise requires: (1) sufficiently regular environment, (2) prolonged practice with good feedback. Chess yes, stock-picking no.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 22).
• System 1 proposes, System 2 endorses (importance 4): System 1 continuously generates impressions and intentions. System 2 monitors but usually rubber-stamps them.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 1).
• tyranny of the remembering self (importance 4): We make choices to serve the remembering self, not the experiencing self. Leads to duration neglect and sacrificing lived experience.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• base-rate neglect (importance 3): System 1 focuses on specific case information and ignores statistical base rates, even when base rates are more diagnostic.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 14).
• coherence over completeness (importance 3): System 1 prioritizes narrative coherence over evidentiary completeness. A good story beats comprehensive data.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 7).
• optimistic bias (endemic) (importance 3): Most people are unrealistically optimistic about their futures. Entrepreneurs especially so—most new businesses fail.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 24).
• rare events overweighted (dual mechanism) (importance 3): Small probabilities overweighted both in decision weights (Prospect Theory) and via vividness/availability in System 1.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 29).
• illusion of skill (fund managers) (importance 3): Stock pickers show no persistent skill. Past performance doesn't predict future returns. Success is mostly luck + fees.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 21).
• statistical formulas beat experts (importance 3): Simple statistical algorithms consistently outperform human experts across many domains. Experts don't believe this.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 21).
• resistance to algorithms (human exceptionalism) (importance 3): People strongly prefer human judgment to algorithms, even when shown algorithms are more accurate. Loss of autonomy threat.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 21).
• expert overconfidence (predictions) (importance 3): Experts are more confident than accurate. Confidence reflects coherence of their story, not predictive validity.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 20).
• well-being measurement paradox (importance 3): Life satisfaction and experienced well-being are different constructs. Both valid but measure different things.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• Bernoulli wealth-based evaluation (importance 2): Expected Utility Theory assumes people evaluate outcomes by final wealth states. Empirically false—they evaluate changes.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 25).

Empirical results

• bat-and-ball problem (50%+ fail) (importance 3): A bat and ball cost $1.10 total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. Most people intuitively answer 10 cents (wrong); correct is 5 cents.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 2). Quote: "More than 50% of students at Harvard, MIT, and Princeton gave the intuitive—incorrect—answer".
• UN wheel-of-fortune anchoring study (importance 3): Spinning a rigged wheel (10 or 65) before estimating African nations in UN shifted estimates by ~15 percentage points.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 11).
• Linda problem (conjunction fallacy) (importance 3): 85% of participants judged 'Linda is a bank teller and feminist' more probable than 'Linda is a bank teller' despite logical impossibility.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 15).
• loss aversion coefficient ≈ 1.5–2.5 (importance 3): Empirical studies consistently find people need gains 1.5 to 2.5 times larger than losses to accept mixed gambles.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• Asian disease problem (framing) (importance 3): 72% chose sure-save-200 over gamble when framed as gains; 78% chose gamble over sure-400-die when framed as losses.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 28).
• colonoscopy peak-end study (importance 3): Adding mild discomfort at the end (longer procedure) improved remembered utility and willingness to return. Duration neglect + peak-end.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• cold-hand water immersion study (importance 3): 60s at 14°C + 30s warming to 15°C rated better than 60s at 14°C alone. Preference for longer suffering due to better ending.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 35).
• happiness-income satiation ($75k/2010) (importance 3): Emotional well-being rises with income up to ~$75,000/year (2010 dollars), then plateaus. Life satisfaction continues rising.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaler mug experiment (importance 2): Students given mugs demanded ~$7 to sell; students without mugs offered ~$3 to buy. 2× gap violates economic theory.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 27).
• Samuelson's colleague paradox (importance 2): Economist rejected one favorable gamble but accepted 100 identical gambles. Shows narrow framing + loss aversion in single trial.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 30).
• paraplegic vs lottery winner (Brickman) (importance 2): One year later, paraplegics and lottery winners reported similar happiness levels. Adaptation more powerful than people predict.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 38).
• glucose restores self-control (importance 2): Studies showed glucose drinks restore depleted self-control. (Note: replication crisis has questioned some ego depletion findings.). Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 2).

Methods

• premortem technique (Klein) (importance 3): Before finalizing a plan, imagine it has failed spectacularly. List reasons why. Surfaces doubts that groupthink suppresses.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 24).
• adversarial collaboration (importance 2): Klein and Kahneman's method: researchers with opposing views design joint studies. Reduces confirmation bias.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 22).

Entities

• Amos Tversky (1937–1996) (importance 3): Kahneman's collaborator. Co-developed Prospect Theory and the heuristics-and-biases program. Died before Nobel awarded.. Source: (from training memory of book — throughout).
• Richard Thaler (importance 3): Behavioral economist. Developed mental accounting and endowment effect. Bridged psychology and economics.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapters 27, 30).
• heuristics-and-biases research program (importance 3): Kahneman and Tversky's systematic study of judgment under uncertainty. Founded behavioral economics.. Source: (from training memory of book — throughout).
• behavioral economics (field) (importance 3): Economics incorporating psychological insights. Founded by Kahneman-Tversky-Thaler. Now mainstream.. Source: (from training memory of book — throughout).
• Klein-Kahneman agreement (2009) (importance 2): Gary Klein (intuition advocate) and Kahneman (heuristics researcher) resolved their debate: both right, different domains.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 22).
• Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory (importance 2): Classical economic model: people maximize expected utility based on probabilities and values. Assumes rationality.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 25).
• Allais paradox (1953) (importance 2): Preference pattern that violates Expected Utility Theory. Demonstrated systematically by Kahneman-Tversky in 1979.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 26).
• Paul Slovic (importance 2): Collaborator on early heuristics research. Expert on risk perception and the affect heuristic.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 12).
• Gary Klein (importance 2): Psychologist who studied expert intuition. Initially opposed Kahneman's heuristics research; later found common ground.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 22).
• Meehl's Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction (importance 2): 1954 book documenting algorithms beating experts. Ignored by clinicians. Foundational for modern evidence-based practice.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 21).
• Tetlock's expert political judgment study (importance 2): 20-year study found political experts' predictions barely beat chance. More famous experts did worse.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 20).
• Müller-Lyer illusion (visual) (importance 2): Visual illusion where equal lines look different due to arrow endings. Analogy for cognitive illusions—knowing doesn't fix them.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 1).
• dual-process theory (general) (importance 2): Broad category of psychological theories distinguishing automatic and controlled processes. System 1/2 is one version.. Source: (from training memory of book — introduction).
• rational agent model (economics) (importance 2): Standard economic assumption: people have stable preferences, maximize expected utility, update beliefs by Bayes' rule.. Source: (from training memory of book — Chapter 25).

Relations

• Kahneman's System 1 requires Kahneman's System 2
• Kahneman's System 2 enables Kahneman's System 1
• Kahneman's System 1 exemplifies associative machine (System 1)
• Kahneman's System 1 enables cognitive ease
• cognitive ease requires Kahneman's System 2
• Kahneman's System 2 exemplifies System 2 as lazy controller
• System 2 as lazy controller evidences bat-and-ball problem (50%+ fail)
• Kahneman's System 1 enables anchoring effect
• anchoring effect evidences UN wheel-of-fortune anchoring study
• Kahneman's System 1 enables availability heuristic
• Kahneman's System 1 enables representativeness heuristic
• representativeness heuristic evidences Linda problem (conjunction fallacy)
• representativeness heuristic enables base-rate neglect
• Kahneman's System 1 enables substitution heuristic (the core move)
• substitution heuristic (the core move) generalizes availability heuristic
• substitution heuristic (the core move) generalizes representativeness heuristic
• substitution heuristic (the core move) generalizes affect heuristic
• Kahneman's System 1 enables WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)
• WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) supports coherence over completeness
• WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) enables halo effect
• WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) enables illusion of validity
• Kahneman's System 1 enables affect heuristic
• regression to the mean contradicts illusion of validity
• coherence over completeness enables narrative fallacy
• narrative fallacy enables hindsight bias (knew-it-all-along)
• hindsight bias (knew-it-all-along) enables outcome bias
• expert intuition validity conditions evidences Klein-Kahneman agreement (2009)
• expert intuition validity conditions requires Kahneman's System 1
• planning fallacy exemplifies inside view (singular focus)
• inside view (singular focus) contradicts outside view (reference class)
• outside view (reference class) supports regression to the mean
• optimistic bias (endemic) supports planning fallacy
• optimistic bias (endemic) enables illusion of control
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory requires reference point (Prospect Theory)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory requires loss aversion (Prospect Theory)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory requires diminishing sensitivity (value function)
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) evidences loss aversion coefficient ≈ 1.5–2.5
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) enables endowment effect
• endowment effect evidences Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaler mug experiment
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) enables status quo bias
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) enables sunk-cost fallacy
• reference point (Prospect Theory) enables framing effect
• framing effect evidences Asian disease problem (framing)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory enables fourfold pattern (Prospect Theory)
• fourfold pattern (Prospect Theory) exemplifies possibility effect
• fourfold pattern (Prospect Theory) exemplifies certainty effect
• possibility effect supports rare events overweighted (dual mechanism)
• availability heuristic supports rare events overweighted (dual mechanism)
• Thaler mental accounting enables narrow framing
• narrow framing contradicts broad framing (rational ideal)
• narrow framing evidences Samuelson's colleague paradox
• Thaler mental accounting enables disposition effect (stocks)
• sunk-cost fallacy requires Thaler mental accounting
• experiencing self exemplifies experienced utility (Bentham)
• remembering self exemplifies remembered utility (retrospective)
• remembered utility (retrospective) requires peak-end rule
• remembered utility (retrospective) requires duration neglect
• peak-end rule evidences colonoscopy peak-end study
• duration neglect evidences colonoscopy peak-end study
• peak-end rule evidences cold-hand water immersion study
• duration neglect evidences cold-hand water immersion study
• focusing illusion enables affective forecasting (Gilbert)
• affective forecasting (Gilbert) evidences paraplegic vs lottery winner (Brickman)
• remembering self enables life satisfaction (global judgment)
• life satisfaction (global judgment) evidences happiness-income satiation ($75k/2010)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory refutes Econs vs Humans (Thaler)
• Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory requires Econs vs Humans (Thaler)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory contradicts Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory
• Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory requires Bernoulli wealth-based evaluation
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory refutes Bernoulli wealth-based evaluation
• Allais paradox (1953) refutes Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory requires decision weights (Prospect Theory)
• theory-induced blindness exemplifies Bernoulli Expected Utility Theory
• Amos Tversky (1937–1996) cites Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory
• Paul Slovic cites affect heuristic
• Richard Thaler cites Thaler mental accounting
• Richard Thaler cites endowment effect
• Gary Klein cites expert intuition validity conditions
• Gary Klein cites Klein-Kahneman agreement (2009)
• illusion of validity exemplifies illusion of skill (fund managers)
• illusion of skill (fund managers) supports statistical formulas beat experts
• Meehl's Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction evidences statistical formulas beat experts
• statistical formulas beat experts contradicts resistance to algorithms (human exceptionalism)
• premortem technique (Klein) refutes planning fallacy
• premortem technique (Klein) cites Gary Klein
• decision hygiene refutes cognitive illusions (systematic)
• illusion of validity exemplifies expert overconfidence (predictions)
• expert overconfidence (predictions) evidences Tetlock's expert political judgment study
• Kahneman's System 1 enables cognitive illusions (systematic)
• cognitive illusions (systematic) exemplifies Müller-Lyer illusion (visual)
• Kahneman's System 1 exemplifies System 1 proposes, System 2 endorses
• Kahneman's System 2 exemplifies System 1 proposes, System 2 endorses
• Kahneman's System 2 requires ego depletion (System 2 fatigue)
• ego depletion (System 2 fatigue) evidences glucose restores self-control
• dual-process theory (general) generalizes Kahneman's System 1
• dual-process theory (general) generalizes Kahneman's System 2
• heuristics-and-biases research program cites availability heuristic
• heuristics-and-biases research program cites representativeness heuristic
• heuristics-and-biases research program cites anchoring effect
• rational agent model (economics) contradicts behavioral economics (field)
• Kahneman-Tversky Prospect Theory enables behavioral economics (field)
• adversarial collaboration exemplifies Klein-Kahneman agreement (2009)
• remembering self exemplifies tyranny of the remembering self
• experiencing self contradicts tyranny of the remembering self
• life satisfaction (global judgment) exemplifies well-being measurement paradox
• experienced utility (Bentham) exemplifies well-being measurement paradox
• subjective well-being (two measures) generalizes life satisfaction (global judgment)
• subjective well-being (two measures) generalizes experienced utility (Bentham)
• Kahneman's System 1 enables halo effect
• System 2 as lazy controller supports System 1 proposes, System 2 endorses
• associative machine (System 1) enables WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)
• narrative fallacy supports illusion of validity
• inside view (singular focus) requires narrative fallacy
• outside view (reference class) refutes base-rate neglect
• Thaler mental accounting supports sunk-cost fallacy
• loss aversion (Prospect Theory) enables narrow framing
• certainty equivalent evidences loss aversion coefficient ≈ 1.5–2.5
• focusing illusion enables life satisfaction (global judgment)
• premortem technique (Klein) refutes inside view (singular focus)
• decision hygiene requires resistance to algorithms (human exceptionalism)
• expert overconfidence (predictions) requires narrative fallacy

© 2026 LOOMUS. Curation, importance scoring, edge typing, and visualization. Source paper © respective authors, quoted under fair use.